Directive /65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive /92/EC. Dyrektywa Komisji /73/WE z dnia 10 sierpnia r. wprowadzająca środki wykonawcze do dyrektywy /39/WE Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w. Is MiFID II a Desired Regulation? (Zadowolenie klienta indywidualnego z doradztwa inwestycyjnego. Czy Dyrektywa MiFID II to potrzebne rozwiazanie?).
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OJ L Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53 1 thereof. Since further amendments are to be made, it should be recast in the interests of clarity. To that end, that Directive aimed to harmonise the initial authorisation and operating requirements for investment firms including conduct of business rules. It also provided for the harmonisation of some conditions governing the operation of regulated markets.
In recent years more investors mifjd become active in the cyrektywa markets and are offered an even more complex wide-ranging set of services and instruments. In view of those developments the legal framework of the Union should encompass the full range of investor-oriented activities.
To that end, it is necessary to provide for the degree of harmonisation needed to offer investors a high level of protection and to allow investment firms to provide services throughout the Union, being kifid internal market, on the basis of home country supervision. The financial crisis has exposed weaknesses in the functioning and in the transparency of financial markets.
The evolution of financial markets has exposed the need to strengthen the framework for vyrektywa regulation of markets in financial instruments, including where trading in such markets takes place over-the-counter OTCin order to increase transparency, better protect investors, reinforce confidence, address unregulated areas, and ensure that supervisors are granted adequate powers to fulfil their tasks.
There is agreement among regulatory bodies at international level that weaknesses in corporate governance in a number of financial institutions, including the absence of effective checks and balances within them, have been a contributory factor to the financial crisis.
Excessive and imprudent risk taking may lead to the failure of individual financial institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally. Incorrect conduct of firms providing services to clients may lead to investor detriment and loss of investor confidence. Those principles and standards should apply taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of investment firms.
In the context of the future European supervision architecture, the European Council of 18 and 19 June also stressed the need to establish a European single rulebook applicable to all financial institutions in the internal market. Together, both legal instruments should form the legal framework governing the requirements applicable to investment firms, regulated markets, data reporting services providers and third country firms providing investment services or activities in the Union.
This Directive should therefore be read together with that Regulation. This Directive should contain the provisions governing the authorisation of the business, the acquisition of qualifying holding, the exercise of the freedom of establishment and of the freedom to provide services, the operating conditions for investment firms to ensure investor protection, the powers of supervisory authorities of dyrekytwa and host Member States and the regime for imposing sanctions.
Since the main objective and subject-matter of this Directive is to harmonise national provisions concerning the areas referred to, it should be based on Article 53 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TFEU.
The form of a Directive is appropriate in order to enable the implementing provisions in the areas covered by this Directive, when necessary, to be adjusted to any existing specificities of the particular market and legal system in each Member State. It is appropriate dyrrktywa include in the list of financial instruments commodity derivatives and others which are constituted and traded in such a manner as to give rise to regulatory issues comparable to traditional financial instruments.
Several measures have been taken to mitigate the impact of such an inclusion on firms trading those products. The limitation of the scope concerning commodity derivatives traded on an OTF and physically settled should be limited to avoid a loophole that may lead to regulatory arbitrage. Its scope should therefore not cover any person with a different professional activity. It is necessary to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime governing the execution of transactions in financial instruments irrespective of the trading methods used to conclude those transactions so as to ensure a high quality of execution of investor transactions and to uphold the integrity and overall efficiency of the financial system.
A coherent and risk-sensitive framework for regulating the main types of order-execution arrangement currently active in the European financial marketplace should be provided for. It is necessary to recognise the emergence of a mifod generation of organised trading systems alongside regulated markets which should be subjected to obligations designed to preserve the efficient and orderly functioning of financial markets and to ensure that such organised trading systems do not benefit from regulatory miifid.
All trading venues, namely regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities MTFsand OTFs, should lay down transparent and non-discriminatory rules governing access to the facility. However, while regulated markets and MTFs should continue to be subject to similar requirements regarding whom they may admit as members or participants, OTFs should be able to determine and restrict access based, inter alia, on the role and obligations which they have in relation to their clients. In that regard, trading venues should be able to specify parameters governing the system such as dyreitywa latency provided that that is done in an open and transparent manner and does not involve discrimination by the platform operator.
Persons having access to regulated markets or MTFs are referred to as members or participants. Both terms may be used interchangeably. Those terms do not include users who only access the trading venues via direct electronic access.
Systematic internalisers should be defined as investment dyrekyywa which, on an organised, frequent, systematic and substantial basis, deal on own account when executing client orders outside a regulated market, an MTF or an OTF. In order to ensure the objective and effective application of that definition to investment firms, any bilateral trading carried out with clients should be relevant and criteria should be developed for the identification of investment firms required to register as systematic internalisers.
Dhrektywa trading venues are facilities in which multiple third party buying and selling interests interact in the system, a systematic internaliser should not be allowed to bring together third party buying and selling interests in functionally the same way as a trading venue.
Persons administering their own assets and undertakings, who do not provide investment services or perform investment activities other than dealing on own account in financial instruments which are not commodity derivatives, emission allowances or derivatives thereof, should not be covered by the scope of this Directive unless they are market makers, members or participants of a regulated market or an MTF or have direct electronic access to a trading venue, apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique, or deal on own account when executing client orders.
Technical criteria for when an activity is ancillary to dyremtywa a main business should be clarified in regulatory technical standards, taking into account the criteria specified in this Directive. Those criteria should ensure that non-financial firms dealing in financial instruments in a disproportionate manner compared with the level of investment in the main business are covered by the scope of this Directive.
In doing so, those criteria should take at least into consideration, the need for ancillary activities to constitute a minority of activities at group level and the size of their trading activity compared to the overall market trading activity in that asset class.
It is appropriate that where the obligation to provide liquidity on a venue is required by regulatory authorities in accordance with Union or national laws, regulations and administrative provisions or by trading venues, the transactions entered into to meet such an obligation should be excluded in the assessment of whether the activity is ancillary. Persons that deal in mifidd derivatives, emission allowance and derivatives thereof may also deal in other financial instruments as part of their commercial treasury risk management activities to protect themselves against risks, such as exchange rate risks.
Therefore, it is important to clarify that exemptions apply cumulatively. For example, the exemption in point j of Article 2 1 can be used in conjunction with the exemption in point d of Article 2 1. However, in order to avoid any potential misuse of exemptions, market makers in financial instruments, other than market makers in commodity derivatives, emission allowances or derivatives thereof provided that their market making activity is ancillary to their main business considered on a group basis and provided that they do not apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique, should be covered by the scope of dydektywa Directive and should not benefit from any exemption.
Persons dealing on own account when executing client orders or applying a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique should also be covered by the scope of this Directive and should not benefit from any exemption. Dealing on own account when executing client orders should include firms executing orders from different clients by matching them on a matched principal basis back-to-back tradingwhich should be regarded as acting as principal and should be subject to the provisions of this Dyrektyea covering both the execution of orders on behalf of clients and dealing on own account.
References in the text to persons should be understood as including both natural and legal persons.
Stan procesu implementacji pakietu MiFID II
Persons who do not provide services for third parties but whose business consists in providing investment services solely for their parent undertakings, for their subsidiaries, or for other subsidiaries of their parent undertakings should not be covered by this Directive.
Some local energy utilities and some operators of industrial installations covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme bundle and out-source their trading activities for hedging commercial risks to non-consolidated subsidiaries.
Those joint venture companies do not provide any other services and perform exactly the same function as the persons referred to in Recital However, in order to ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place and that investors are adequately protected, Member States that choose to exempt such joint ventures should subject them to requirements at least analogous to the ones laid down in this Directive, dryektywa particular during the phase of authorisation, in the assessment of their reputation and experience and of the suitability of any shareholders, in the review of the conditions for initial authorisation and on-going supervision as well as on conduct of business obligations.
Persons who provide investment services only on an incidental basis in the course of professional activity should also be excluded from the scope of this Directive, provided that that activity is regulated and the relevant rules do not prohibit the provision, on an incidental basis, of investment services.
Dyrrktywa who provide investment services consisting exclusively in the administration of employee-participation schemes and who therefore do not provide investment services for third parties should not be covered by this Directive. It is necessary to exclude from the scope of this Directive central banks and mifix bodies performing similar functions as well as public bodies charged with or intervening in the management of public debt, which concept covers dyrrektywa investment thereof, with the exception of bodies that are partly or wholly state-owned the role of which is commercial or linked to the acquisition of holdings.
In order to clarify the regime of exemptions for the European System of Central Banks ESCBother national bodies performing similar functions and bodies dyeektywa in the management of public debt, it is appropriate to limit such exemptions to the bodies and institutions dyrfktywa their functions in accordance with the law of mlfid Member State or in accordance with the Union law, as well as to international dyrekhywa of which two or more Member States are members and which have the purpose of mobilising funding and providing financial assistance to the benefit of their members that are experiencing or threatened by severe financing problems, such as the Dyrekytwa Stability Mechanism.
EUR-Lex – L – EN – EUR-Lex
It is necessary to exclude from the scope of this Directive collective investment undertakings and pension funds whether or not coordinated at Union level, and the depositaries or managers of such undertakings, since they are subject to specific rules directly adapted to their activities.
In accordance with those legislative acts, transmission system operators have specific obligations and responsibilities, are subject to specific certification and are supervised by sector specific competent authorities. Transmission system operators should also benefit from such an exemption where they use other persons acting as service providers on their behalf to carry out their task under those legislative acts or under network codes or guidelines adopted pursuant to those Regulations.
Transmission system operators should not be able to benefit from such an exemption when providing investment services or activities in financial instruments, including when operating a platform for secondary trading in financial transmission rights. In order to benefit from the exemptions from this Directive, the person concerned should comply on a continuous basis with the conditions laid down for such exemptions. Structured deposits have emerged as a form of investment product but are not covered under any legislative act for the protection of investors at Union level, while mifie structured investments are covered by such legislative acts.
It is therefore appropriate to strengthen the confidence of investors and to make regulatory treatment concerning the dyretkywa of different packaged retail mifd products more uniform in order to ensure an adequate level of investor protection across the Union. For that reason, it is appropriate to include in the scope of this Directive structured deposits. In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that since structured deposits are a form of investment product, they do not include deposits linked solely to interest rates, such as Euribor or Libor, regardless of whether or not the interest rates are predetermined, or whether they are fixed or variable.
Such deposits should therefore be excluded from the scope of this Directive. Central securities depositaries CSDs are systemically important institutions for financial markets that ensure the initial recording of securities, the maintenance of the accounts containing the securities issued and the settlement of virtually all trades of securities.
CSDs are to be specifically regulated under Union law and subject, in particular, to authorisation and certain operating conditions. However, CSDs might, in addition to the core services referred to in other Union law, provide investment services and activities which are regulated under this Directive.
In order to ensure that any entities providing investment services and activities are subject to the same regulatory framework, it is appropriate to ensure that such CSDs are not subject to the requirements of this Directive relating to authorisation and certain operating conditions but that Union law regulating CSDs as such should ensure that they are subject to the provisions of this Directive when they provide investment services or perform investment activities in addition to the services specified in that Union law.
In order to strengthen the protection of investors in the Union, it is appropriate to limit the conditions under which Member States may exclude the application of this Directive to persons providing investment services to clients who, as a result, are not protected under this Directive.
In particular, it is appropriate to require Member States to apply requirements at least analogous to the ones laid down in this Directive to those persons, in particular during the phase of authorisation, in the assessment of their reputation and experience and of the suitability of any shareholders, in the review of the conditions for initial authorisation and on-going supervision as well as on conduct of business obligations.
Where an investment firm provides one or more investment services not covered by its authorisation, or performs one or more investment activities not covered by its authorisation, on a non-regular basis it should not need an additional authorisation under this Directive.
For the purposes of this Directive, the business of reception and transmission of orders should also include bringing together two or more investors, thereby bringing about a transaction between those investors. Investment firms and credit institutions distributing financial instruments they issue themselves should be subject to this Directive when they provide investment advice to their clients.
In order to eliminate uncertainty and strengthen investor protection, it is appropriate to provide for the application of this Directive when, in the primary market, investment firms and credit institutions distribute financial instruments issued by them without providing any advice.
To that end, the definition of the service of execution of orders on behalf of clients should be extended.
Translation of “dyrektywa MiFID” in English
An investment firm which is a legal person should be authorised in the Member State in which it has its registered office. An investment firm which is not a legal person should be authorised in the Member State in which it has its head office. In order to provide legal certainty, clarity and predictability with regard to the assessment process, as well as to the result thereof, it is appropriate to confirm the criteria and the process of prudential assessment laid down in that Directive.
In particular, competent authorities should appraise the suitability of the proposed acquirer and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition against all of the following criteria: An investment firm authorised in its home Member State should be entitled to provide investment services or perform investment activities throughout the Union without the need to seek a separate authorisation from the competent authority in the Member State in which it wishes to provide such services or perform such activities.
That particular treatment for the purposes of capital adequacy should be without prejudice to any decisions regarding the appropriate treatment of those firms under future changes to Union law on capital adequacy. Since mitid scope of prudential regulation should be limited to those entities which, by virtue of running a trading book on a professional basis, represent a source of a counterparty risk to other market participants, entities which dytektywa on own account in financial instruments other than commodity derivatives, emission allowances or derivatives thereof, should be excluded mifix the scope of fyrektywa Directive provided that they are not market makers, do not deal on own account when executing client orders, are not members or participants of a regulated market or MTF, do not have direct electronic access to a trading venue and do not dyretkywa a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique.
This principle should not, however, prevent a firm from doing business in its name but on behalf of the investor, where that is required by the very dyrrktywa of the transaction and the investor is in agreement, for example stock lending.
The requirements concerning the protection of client assets are a dyeektywa tool for the protection of clients in the provision of services and activities. Those requirements can be excluded dyrektysa full ownership of funds and financial instrument is transferred to an investment firm to cover any present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations. That broad possibility may create uncertainty and jeopardise the effectiveness of the requirements concerning the safeguard of client assets.
It is necessary to strengthen the role of management bodies of investment firms, regulated markets and data reporting services providers in ensuring sound and prudent management of the firms, the promotion of the integrity of the market and the interest of investors. To avoid group thinking and facilitate independent opinions and critical challenge, management bodies should therefore be sufficiently diverse as regards age, gender, geographic provenance and educational and professional background to present a variety of views and experiences.
Employee representation in management bodies could also, by adding a key perspective and genuine knowledge of the internal workings of firms, be seen as a positive way of enhancing diversity. Therefore, diversity should be one of the criteria for the composition of management bodies. That policy should, for instance, encourage firms to select candidates from shortlists including both genders. The management body should assume clear responsibilities across the business cycle of the firm, in the areas of the identification and definition of the strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal governance of the firm, of the approval of its internal organisation, including criteria for selection and training of personnel, of effective oversight of senior management, of the definition of the overall policies governing the provision of services and activities, including the remuneration of sales staff and the approval of new products for distribution to clients.
Periodic monitoring and assessment of the strategic objectives of firms, their internal organisation and their policies for the provision of services and activities should ensure their continuous ability to deliver sound and prudent management, in the interest of the integrity of the markets and the protection of investors.
Combining too high a number of directorships would preclude a member of the management body from spending adequate time on the performance of that oversight role. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the number of directorships a member of the management body of an institution may hold at the same time in different entities. However, directorships in organisations which do not pursue predominantly commercial objectives, such as not-for-profit or charitable organisations, should not be taken into account for the purposes of applying such a limit.
Different governance structures are used across Member States.